Educational studies increasingly highlight the relevance of affectivity. Emotions, in particular, are regarded as a key-point in order to make meaningful, motivating and effective the educational relation. Anyway, the moral implications of the purpose of educate the emotions are often understudied. My dissertation aims at clarifying which thesis the neo-aristotelian Virtue Ethics hold about emotion education, by integrating philosophy of education, philosophy of emotions and moral epistemology. Chapter one argues that pedagogy and practical philosophy are similar and synergistic disciplines, in so far both aim at making better their object of inquiry. After the identification of this shared ground, I present the thematic and historical background of the neo-aristotelian Virtue Ethics, as a specific kind of ethics in the analytic tradition, then I argue that Virtue Ethics, compared to deontology and utilitarianism-consequentialism, offer the more appropriate framework to conceive the relations between education, emotions and ethics. Chapter two discusses the most important cognitive-evaluative philosophical theories of emotions, showing advantages and disadvantages of the approaches considered. I will end up by claiming that emotion education requires, to be a consistent project, cognitivism about emotions and a qualified realism about moral value. In chapter three I address the anti-rationalist challenge based on empirical evidence about how emotions impact on moral judgments. Anti-rationalism, I claim, is incompatible with the purpose of shaping the emotions looking at our best moral reasons. I will defend a moderate rationalism, according to which habitual and automatic processes – as the emotions – could count as rational and morally appropriate, to the extent that they are the consequence of education. Then I discuss two educational theses: (1) all the emotional dispositions – both “positive” and “negative” – should be cultivated, and (2) all the emotional dispositions admit an appropriate moral form. To conclude, I examine three emotions: shame, envy and admiration. For each emotion I discuss the educational value for the ethical formation of the person.

Formazione etica ed emozioni. Prospettive di Virtue Ethics neo-aristotelica / ariele niccoli. - (2019).

Formazione etica ed emozioni. Prospettive di Virtue Ethics neo-aristotelica.

ariele niccoli
2019

Abstract

Educational studies increasingly highlight the relevance of affectivity. Emotions, in particular, are regarded as a key-point in order to make meaningful, motivating and effective the educational relation. Anyway, the moral implications of the purpose of educate the emotions are often understudied. My dissertation aims at clarifying which thesis the neo-aristotelian Virtue Ethics hold about emotion education, by integrating philosophy of education, philosophy of emotions and moral epistemology. Chapter one argues that pedagogy and practical philosophy are similar and synergistic disciplines, in so far both aim at making better their object of inquiry. After the identification of this shared ground, I present the thematic and historical background of the neo-aristotelian Virtue Ethics, as a specific kind of ethics in the analytic tradition, then I argue that Virtue Ethics, compared to deontology and utilitarianism-consequentialism, offer the more appropriate framework to conceive the relations between education, emotions and ethics. Chapter two discusses the most important cognitive-evaluative philosophical theories of emotions, showing advantages and disadvantages of the approaches considered. I will end up by claiming that emotion education requires, to be a consistent project, cognitivism about emotions and a qualified realism about moral value. In chapter three I address the anti-rationalist challenge based on empirical evidence about how emotions impact on moral judgments. Anti-rationalism, I claim, is incompatible with the purpose of shaping the emotions looking at our best moral reasons. I will defend a moderate rationalism, according to which habitual and automatic processes – as the emotions – could count as rational and morally appropriate, to the extent that they are the consequence of education. Then I discuss two educational theses: (1) all the emotional dispositions – both “positive” and “negative” – should be cultivated, and (2) all the emotional dispositions admit an appropriate moral form. To conclude, I examine three emotions: shame, envy and admiration. For each emotion I discuss the educational value for the ethical formation of the person.
2019
Alessandro Mariani
ariele niccoli
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Utilizza questo identificatore per citare o creare un link a questa risorsa: https://hdl.handle.net/2158/1154035
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