VCG-Based Incentive-Compatible LQ Control for Truthful and Efficient Vehicle Platooning

Vehicle platooning enhances fuel efficiency, traffic flow, and safety by maintaining a common velocity and minimizing acceleration fluctuations. However, strategic misreporting in cooperative control can lead to inefficiencies. To address this, the present work proposes a pricing-based Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism that ensures truthful cost reporting, aligning individual incentives with collective goals. Applied to platooning, the approach optimizes velocity and spacing while minimizing energy use and discomfort. A supervisor solves a linear quadratic (LQ) control problem based on declared costs, with a pricing mechanism penalizing misreporting. This method is particularly relevant for freight convoys, ride-sharing fleets, and autonomous vehicle formations, where operators or autonomous agents may have competing priorities. By enforcing truthful participation, the framework enhances sustainability, efficiency, and stability in cooperative driving, benefiting commercial and public transportation networks.