The protection of the right not to provide information contra se in financial investigations. Reconciling an apparent dichotomy

The thesis aims to assess the implications that financial investigations conducted within the framework of the EU anti-money laundering and terrorism financing preventive legislation have on the respect of fundamental rights of those engaging with the financial system. Although the issues posed by the follow the money approach, i.e., the set of investigative measures aimed at tackling the proceeds of crimes, have been widely addressed in the literature, their implications for fundamental rights have not yet received much attention. In particular, in view of the peculiar features of preventive investigations, which appear to be in contrast with those stemming from criminal procedural law and human rights law, we ask ourselves whether financial investigations, as designed within the EU legal framework, are consistent with the right of customers not to provide competent authorities with self-incriminating information. By drawing from EU law provisions and case law on the privilege against self-incrimination on one hand, and data protection on the other, we show that some steps indeed can be taken to reconcile two apparently opposite concepts, that is, the AML/CTF preventive system, which is marked by strong cooperation and disclosure duties, and the right to have control over personal (incriminating) information. The research is conducted against the framework shaped by the securitization and privatization phenomena, which are highly influential on the field of financial investigations and information sharing.