The best shot game applied to networks is a discrete model of many processes of contribution to local public goods. It generally has a wide multiplicity of equilibria that we refine through stochastic stability. We show that, depending on how we define perturbations – i.e., possible mistakes that agents make – we can obtain very different sets of stochastically stable states. In particular and non-trivially, if we assume that the only possible source of error is that of a contributing agent that stops doing so, then the only stochastically stable states are Nash equilibria with the largest contribution.

Stochastic stability in best shot network games / Boncinelli, Leonardo; Pin, Paolo. - In: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR. - ISSN 0899-8256. - STAMPA. - 75:(2012), pp. 538-554. [10.1016/j.geb.2012.03.001]

Stochastic stability in best shot network games

BONCINELLI, LEONARDO;
2012

Abstract

The best shot game applied to networks is a discrete model of many processes of contribution to local public goods. It generally has a wide multiplicity of equilibria that we refine through stochastic stability. We show that, depending on how we define perturbations – i.e., possible mistakes that agents make – we can obtain very different sets of stochastically stable states. In particular and non-trivially, if we assume that the only possible source of error is that of a contributing agent that stops doing so, then the only stochastically stable states are Nash equilibria with the largest contribution.
2012
75
538
554
Boncinelli, Leonardo; Pin, Paolo
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Utilizza questo identificatore per citare o creare un link a questa risorsa: https://hdl.handle.net/2158/961005
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