Protected Designation of Origin and Protected Geographical Indication are European labeling regulations aimed at protecting names of origin and traditional methods of production of specialty foods. Property rights on these marks are allocated, by a public authority, to a specific area. However, the size of the protected area is hardly defined solely on technical characteristics, rather it is often an issue of political debate among different stakeholders (producers and consumers). This paper aims at investigating the bargaining process leading to the definition of a Geographical Indication area. Drawing on historical evidence from three cases, we build a three-stage Political Economy Model in which the size of the protected area is endogenously determined. The resulting politically optimal area is compared to the social optimum. Results show that lobbying strength, quantity supplied, and market potential play an important role in explaining deviations from the social optimum

Rent Seeking and Political Economy of Geographical Indication Foods / Landi, Chiara; Stefani, Gianluca. - In: AGRIBUSINESS. - ISSN 0742-4477. - STAMPA. - 31:(2015), pp. 543-563. [10.1002/agr.21412]

Rent Seeking and Political Economy of Geographical Indication Foods

LANDI, CHIARA;STEFANI, GIANLUCA
2015

Abstract

Protected Designation of Origin and Protected Geographical Indication are European labeling regulations aimed at protecting names of origin and traditional methods of production of specialty foods. Property rights on these marks are allocated, by a public authority, to a specific area. However, the size of the protected area is hardly defined solely on technical characteristics, rather it is often an issue of political debate among different stakeholders (producers and consumers). This paper aims at investigating the bargaining process leading to the definition of a Geographical Indication area. Drawing on historical evidence from three cases, we build a three-stage Political Economy Model in which the size of the protected area is endogenously determined. The resulting politically optimal area is compared to the social optimum. Results show that lobbying strength, quantity supplied, and market potential play an important role in explaining deviations from the social optimum
2015
31
543
563
Landi, Chiara; Stefani, Gianluca
File in questo prodotto:
File Dimensione Formato  
Landi_et_al-2015-Agribusiness.pdf

Accesso chiuso

Descrizione: articolo principale
Tipologia: Pdf editoriale (Version of record)
Licenza: Tutti i diritti riservati
Dimensione 651.28 kB
Formato Adobe PDF
651.28 kB Adobe PDF   Richiedi una copia

I documenti in FLORE sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.

Utilizza questo identificatore per citare o creare un link a questa risorsa: https://hdl.handle.net/2158/1031150
Citazioni
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.pmc??? ND
  • Scopus 21
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.isi??? 20
social impact