Inapplicabile, ma comunque rilevante? La Carta dei diritti fondamentali nella giurisprudenza della Corte di giustizia sull'indipendenza dei giudici nazionali

Sommario: 1. Introduzione. – 2. La giustiziabilità dell’art. 2 TUE e il rapporto con la Carta dei diritti fondamentali. – 3. La giurisprudenza recente della Corte di giustizia sull’indipendenza dei giudici nazionali. – 4. Una “disconnessione” tra l’ambito di applicazione dell’art. 19, par. 1, comma secondo, TUE e quello della Carta? – 5. Qualche dubbio sulla coerenza e la necessità dell’approccio “disconnesso”. – 6. Riflessioni conclusive: una “disconnessione” (piuttosto) tra rinvio pregiudiziale e procedura di infrazione? In recent times, the Court of Justice has taken the lead in exploring the possibilities offered by the Treaties to counteract the so-called ‘rule of law crisis’ in some Member States. This is a welcome development, which clearly shows that the safeguard of the Union’s founding values is not a domaine réservé of the EU political institutions. At the same time, the new judicial course is not in line with the Fransson judgment, the Court’s leading case on the scope of application of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. The approach of the Court to the Charter is ambiguous, as the latter is considered as being not (formally) applicable to the situations at issue, yet (substantially) relevant. The article discusses this crucial aspect of the novel case law, proposing an alternative solution to deal with the concerns that plausibly fuel the deviation from the Fransson judgment.