La predicazione essenziale nelle Categorie di Aristotele

This article investigates some aspects of the notion of essential predication used by Aristotle in the Categories. In §§ 1–2 I introduce the text of chapter 2 of the treatise, dividing it into its two main parts: the distinction between "things said" (§ 1) and that between "things that are" or entities (§ 2). In § 3 I focus on the notion of "being said of a subject" and consider one possible interpretation of it, which in § 4 I reject with various arguments. In § 5 I illustrate an alternative interpretation, according to which "being said of a subject" is essential predication, and I support it also on the basis of historical considerations. In § 6 I turn to the final lines of the chapter, devoted to the notion of an individual, which Aristotle defines precisely in terms of "being said of a subject". Finally, in § 7 I address some questions concerning the transitivity of "being said of a subject".