“He was defeated by his own Bad Planning”: A Reappraisal of Baduila’s Generalship and Statecraft

Education plays a deceptively minor role in scholarship on late antique kingship and generalship. While it is widely accepted that the training of soldiers was a fundamental part of sixth-century warfare, the relatively long apprenticeship of rulers and generals is often overlooked, since ancient sources are almost invariably silent about it. Yet, a comparative study of Baduila and some other sixth-century leaders clearly shows the fundamental differences between them. Rather than a second Theoderic or an Ostrogothic Belisarius, Baduila had more in common with the barbarian raiders who pillaged the Empire’s frontier regions. He undoubtedly knew how to set ambushes, was capable of quick movements, launched daring raids and secured the loyalty of his troops for more than a decade. However, he never managed to defeat an imperial army in a major pitched battle, since his tactics, the training of his troops and his grasp of late antique military science left much to be desired. A quick overview of his statecraft points out the same limitations. Baduila was not meant to rise above the rank of garrison commander, at least in the short-term, and was hardly prepared to tackle the issues and conventions that accompanied the royal status. He had a pragmatic approach to foreign policy and knew how to exploit his enemy’s weakness, but his overall strategy was flawed by his lack of understanding of sixth-century politics. Moreover, he failed to understand Justinian's aims and sixth-century international customs. These shortcomings were due to the fact that Baduila had neither received an elite education nor taken part in Gothic War until 540. Thus, he could not hope to deal with either Belisarius or Justinian on equal terms.