A unified approach to semantic and soritical paradoxes

The semantic paradoxes and the paradoxes of vagueness (‘soritical paradoxes’) display remarkable family resemblances. In particular, the same non-classical logics have been (independently) applied to both kinds of paradoxes. These facts have been taken by some authors to suggest that truth and vagueness require a unified logical framework (see e.g. [3, 5]). Some authors go further, and argue that truth is itself a vague or indeterminate concept (see e.g. [4, 7]). Importantly, however, there currently is no identification of what the common features of semantic and soritical paradoxes exactly consist in. This is what we aim to do in this work: we analyze semantic and soritical paradoxes, and develop our analysis into a theory of paradoxicality. The unification of the paradoxes of truth and vagueness we propose here has a wide scope, but for the sake of concreteness we focus on four three-valued logics.